

Message Text

PAGE 01 VIENNA 01038 01 OF 02 061956Z

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1510

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1038

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DISCUSSION WITH

POLISH REP FEBRUARY 5, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE DESCRIBES A FEBRUARY 5 DISCUSSION WITH POLISH REP STRULAK IN WHICH LATTER, WHILE MAINTAINING KNOWN EASTERN POSITION ON INCLUSION OF NATIONAL FORCES, AIR AND NUCLEARS, APPEARED WILLING TO ENVISAGE ALLIED TWO-PHASE APPROACH AND ALSO, ALTHOUGH TO LESSER EXTENT, THE COMMON CEILING, PROVIDED POLISH INTERESTS WERE ADEQUATELY MET IN THE PROCESS. THIS IS ONE OF A SERIES OF SIMILAR STATEMENTS ON PART OF STRULAK THOUGH SOMEWHAT MORE SPECIFIC THAN HE HAS BEEN HERETOFORE, VIS-A-VIS US REP. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 01038 01 OF 02 061956Z

2. US REP AND DEPREP AND LEON SLOSS OF PM, ON VISIT TO VIENNA, MET WITH POLISH REP STRULAK ON FEBRUARY 5 AT INVITATION OF US REP. AT OUTSET, US REP COMMENTED THAT STRULAK HAD IN PAST CONVERSATIONS APPEARED WILLING TO

DISCUSS THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE CONCEPT AND THIS HAD BEEN DONE. HE WONDERED WHAT STRULAK NOW THOUGHT ON THIS SUBJECT AFTER HAVING HEARD FURTHER ALLIED VIEWS IN THE INTERIM.

3. STRULAK REPLIED THAT HE STILL CONSIDERED ALLIED TWO-PHASE CONCEPT TOO INDEFINITE AND VAGUE. US REP QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS OBSERVATION WAS ENTIRELY CORRECT. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED OVERALL GOAL OF COMMON CEILING, HAD SUGGESTED FIGURES FOR TOTAL REDUCTIONS AND FOR FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS AND HAD INDICATED QUITE CLEARLY BOTH THAT US WAS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST PHASE AND THAT OTHER ALLIED PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SECOND PHASE. STRULAK SAID THE CONCEPT STILL APPEARED VAGUE TO HIM PARTICULARLY AS TO WHEN AND HOW MUCH THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD REDUCE. US REP QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WAS THE CASE. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR FROM ALLIED FIGURES JUST WHAT ALLIES HAD IN MIND BOTH FOR FIRST AND SECOND STAGE.

4. STRULAK SAID THE MAIN POLISH INTEREST WITH REGARD TO NATIONAL PARTICIPATION WAS THAT IF THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH WERE FOLLOWED, THE BUNDESWEHR AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONAL FORCES WOULD NOT INCREASE IN THE INTERIM AND ALSO THAT THE POLES WOULD NOT HAVE TO INCREASE THEMSELVES. A FREEZE OF NON-U.S. AND NON-SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA UNTIL COMPLETION OF PHASE II WOULD BE ONE WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS. US REP POINTED OUT THAT UNDER PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, BACKED BY PHASE I PLUS A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD MOVE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES PRIOR TO PHASE II OR THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR DOING SO. STRULAK SAID THIS WAS PLAUSIBLE, BUT HE WOULD STILL LIKE TO SEE A COMMITMENT ON PAPER.

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 01038 01 OF 02 061956Z

5. STRULAK ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY ASSURANCE OF WEST EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT EVEN IF A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT WERE TO BE CONCLUDED. US REP COMMENTED THAT A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD DOUBTLESS PROVIDE EXPLICITLY FOR A SECOND PHASE AND THAT SIGNATORY GOVERNMENTS IN AGREEING TO THE FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO THEREBY BE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO HOLD A SECOND PHASE. US REP ASKED STRULAK IF IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE TO TWO-PHASE APPROACH IF HIS QUESTIONS WERE SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED. STRULAK INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A FAIR STATEMENT AS FAR AS IT WENT, BUT IT DID NOT DEAL WITH THE OTHER PRINCIPAL ASPECT OF THE

PROBLEM WHICH CONCERNED THE POLES. THE OTHER PROBLEM WAS THE WESTERN INSISTANCE ON THE COMMON CEILING. THE WEST WAS ACTING AS IF IT WERE ASSUMED EAST WOULD ACCEPT THIS CONCEPT, AND THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE. THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING CONCEPT PROVIDED FOR LOP-SIDED REDUCTIONS. IF WEST INSISTED ON LARGE SOVIET TANK REDUCTION, SOVITS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO A QUID-PRO-QUO REDUCTION BY THE WEST. MOREOVER, A COMMON CEILING SHOULD COVER NOT ONLY MANPOWER INCLUDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER, BUT ALSO EQUIPMENT, SPECIFICALLY AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT DID NOT MAKE MUCH SENSE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE MANPOWER AND TO LEAVE THESE OTHER WEAPONS UNCONTROLLED. US REP ASKED STRULAK IF HE MEANT THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A COMMON CEILING IN EQUIPMENT, NOTING THAT PACT POSSESSED MANY MORE AIRCRAFT AND TANKS THAN WEST. STRULAK INDICATED HE HAD NOT THOUGHT OF THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM AND BACKED AWAY FROM THE ISSUE.

6. US REP NOTED THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARING DIFFERING EQUIPMENT. STRULAK POINTED OUT WEST WANTS TO REDUCE TANKS AND HAD THEREFORE BROUGHT EQUIPMENT INTO THE DISCUSSION. US REP ASKED
SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 01038 02 OF 02 062021Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 1038

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

8. STRULAK STATED THAT FRG BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS WERE THE MAIN INTEREST OF THE POLES. THE POLES WERE NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES

IN EUROPE. THEREFORE FRG REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ASSURED.
HE SAID THAT THE FRG HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION ON BUNDES-
WEHR REDUCTIONS WHICH AS RECENTLY AS LAST SUMMER THE FRG
HAD BEEN CLEARLY WILLING TO MAKE. US REP SAID THAT GIVEN
NATURAL RESIDUAL SUSPICIONS ON BOTH SIDES BASED ON THE
HISTORY OF THE PAST 25 YEARS, IT WAS IN HIS VIEW UP TO
THE U.S. AND SOVIETS TO SET AN EXAMPLE BY TAKING THE
FIRST MOVE. STRULAK STRESSED THAT THE MAIN INTEREST OF THE
POLSIH AUTHORITIES WAS TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN SO DOING TO GIVE THE DETENTE
PROCESS SOME SPECIFIC FORM AND TO KEEP IT GOING. THIS
INTEREST WAS THE PREDOMINANT ONE. IN MAKING THIS POINT,
STRULAK SEEMED TO BE INDICATING THAT THE QUESTION OF HOW
SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 01038 02 OF 02 062021Z

PROGRESS WAS MADE WAS A SECONDARY ONE.

9. COMMENT: IT WAS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT STRULAK,
NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, FELL READILY INTO THE PATTERN
OF DISCUSSING THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL WITHOUT
RESISTANCE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT. HIS MAIN CONCERN
WITH REGARD TO IT APPEARED TO BE OBTAINING SUFFICIENT
ASSURANCES REGARDING EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II.
HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE IDEA OF THE COMMON CEILING WAS
ALSO NOT NEGATIVE ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED HE THOUGHT
THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE ALLIES UNDER THAT CONCEPT
WERE EXCESSIVE FOR THE EAST AND ALSO CRITICIZED THE
CONCEPT FOR NOT COVERING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. STRULAK'S
MENTION OF A FREEZE OF NON-SOVIET AND NON-U.S. FORCES IN THE
AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I AGREEMENT WAS THE THIRD OR FOURTH
MENTION OF THIS CONCEPT WE HAVE NOTED FROM THE POLES. ITS
RECURRENCE APPEARS SIGNIFICANT. THIS CONVERSATION LIKE OTHERS
STRULAK HAS HAD WITH ALLIED REPS APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT, IN
PRINCIPLE, POLES MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE
TWO-PHASE CONCEPT, SUBJECT TO SOME SATISFACTION AS TO
OTHER INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THEIR POSITION WILL REMAIN
DEPENDENT ON THAT OF THE SOVIETS. END COMMENT.
HUMES

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